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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES H. HUPP, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
HON. S. MARK JOHNSON, 
Judge of the Circuit Court, 
State of Utah, Davis County, 
Bountiful Department, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 16603 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Second 
District Court for Davis County, 
Hon. Duffey Palmer, Judge 
Davis County Attorney 
Davis County Courthouse 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
L. E. RICHARDSON 
516 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Petitioner-Appellant 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES H. HUPP, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
HON. S. MARK JOHNSON, 
Judge of the Circuit Court, 
State of Utah, Davis County, 
Bountiful Department, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 16603 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Petitioner petitioned the District Court for an 
Extraordinary Writ prohibiting the defendant from further 
proceedings under a criminal complaint charging petitioner 
with the offense of driving while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor, and ordering the Circuit Court to 
dismiss the charge. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court, after hearing arguments of counsel 
on the 19th day of July, 1979, found that the offenses 
with which petitioner was charged were all separate offenses, 
did not constitute a single criminal episode, and denied 
the Petition. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
That the Order of the District Court denying the 
Petition be reversed, the Petition granted, and an Order 
issued prohibiting further proceedings by the Circuit 
Court and ordering said Circuit Court to dismiss the 
charge against the petitioner. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Petitioner was arrested on the 5th day of January, 
1979, at approximately 1:50 a.m., and thereafter was 
charged by separate ticket complaints with the following 
offenses: driving under the influence of alcohol (Summons 
& Complaint No. A09208-R9); driving with an expired Utah 
driver's license (Summons & Complaint No. A09209-Rl0); 
driving with an expired Utah state vehicle registration 
(Summons & Complaint No. A09210-Rll); and driving with 
expired Utah state vehicle inspection (Summons & Complaint 
No. A09211-Rl2). 
Thereafter, within the time specified in said Summons 
and Complaints, petitioner appeared in the Davis County 
Circuit Court, Bountiful Department, and entered pleas of 
guilty to three of the offenses, to wit: driving with an 
expired Utah driver's license, driving with an expired 
Utah state vehicle registration, and driving with an 
expired Utah state vehicle inspection; which said pleas 
were accepted by the Court, and petitioner was sentenced 
therefor. Petitioner also entered a plea of not guilty to 
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the charge of driving under the influence of alcohol. 
Thereafter, on the 22nd day of May, 1979, petitioner 
was charged in a formal Complaint with driving under the 
3 
influence of intoxicating liquor on the 5th day of January, 
1979. Trial having been set for that date, petitioner 
appeared through counsel, and moved the Court to dismiss 
the charge on the grounds and for the reason that prose-
cution was barred under the provisions of 76-1-403 
1953 as amended. 
The Court denied this said Motion, and also of a 
Motion for Continuance, proceeded to try petitioner in 
absentia, found petitioner guilty of the charge, and set 
a date for sentencing. Petitioner, on the 29th day of 
May, 1979, filed his Verified Petition in the District 
Court of Davis County, State of Utah. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE OFFENSES INVOLVED HEREIN CONSTITUTE A "SINGLE 
CRIMINAL EPISODE," AND ARE CLEARLY WITHIN THE PURVIEW 
OF 76-1-401 (et seq.) U.C.A., 1953, AS AMElmED. 
A. All Charges Grew Out of a "Single Criminal Episode." 
76-1-401 U.C.A., 1953, as aIP.ended, defines a ;'single 
criminal episode" as 
. all conduct which is closely related in time 
and is incident to an attempt to an accomplishment 
of a single criminal objective. (Emphasis added.) 
In State v. Cornish, 571 P.2d 577, and State v. Ireland, 
570 P.2d 1206, the Utah Supreme Court emphasized that the 
test to be applied in determining the existence of a 
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"single criminal episode" includes closeness in time and 
singleness of criminal objective. 
The offenses with which petitioner was charged all 
involved the same act of driving, and were not only close 
in time but occurred simultaneously, which completely 
satisfies the "closely related in time" provision of 
76-1-401 u.c.A., 1953, as amended. 
All of the offenses with which petitioner was 
charged require, as an essential element, the driving of 
the vehicle. In this instance, the charges before the 
Court alleged that petitioner's vehicle was operated in 
Davis County on January 5, 1979, at 0150 hours [it is to 
be noted that the original Summons & Complaint charged the 
offense of driving under the influence of alcohol on 
5 December 1979. However, in the formal Complaint, this 
was changed to driving while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor on January 5, 1979 (R-9 and R-13)). 
Thus, at the time of his arrest, petitioner was operating 
his vehicle with a "single criminal objective," i.e., to 
operate said vehicle illegally. "Criminal objective" is 
to be defined in terms of the act by which the law is 
broken. In this case, it was the petitioner's objective 
to perform the act of driving a vehicle illegally. All 
counts stern from this single act. Further, none of the 
offenses herein charged is illegal until such time as it 
is combined with the driving of a vehicle. Because all 
charges occurred simultaneously and grew out of a single 
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criminal objective, they comprise a "single criminal 
episode" under 76-1-401 U.C.A., 1953, as amended. 
B. Petitioner Is Entitled To The Protection Of The 
Statutory Bars Raised By 76-1-402 and 76-1-403, 
U.C.A., 1953, as amended. 
76-1-402 (1) and (2) (a) (b) U.C.A., 1953, as amended, 
provide: 
5 
76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of a single 
criminal episode.--(1) A defendant may be prosecuted 
in a single criminal action for all separate offenses 
arising out of a single criminal episode; however, 
when the same act of a defendant under a single 
criminal episode shall establish offenses which may 
be punished in different ways under different pro-
visions of this code, the act shall be punishable 
under only one such provision; an acquittal or 
conviction and sentence under any such provision bars 
a prosecution under any other such provision. (Emphasis 
supplied.) 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate 
offenses under a single criminal episode, unless the 
court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant 
shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple 
offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a 
single court, and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney 
at the time the defendant is arraigned on the first 
information or indictment. 
Under the above provisions of 76-1-402(1), a defendant shall 
be punished only under one such provision where the same 
act of the defendant is punishable under different provisions. 
In this instance, the only illegal and criminal act of the 
petitioner was the one instance of the driving of his 
vehicle, and since he has already been convicted and sen-
tenced under three other statutory provisions for this one 
act, his prosecution under 41-6-44 U.C.A., 1953, as amended, 
on a charge of driving a motor vehicle while under the 
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influence of intoxicating liquors, is barred. 
With regard to 76-1-402(2), the offenses with which 
the petitioner was charged were all Class B misdemeanors, 
and are within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, 
the necessity for which was pointed out in the case of 
State v. Sosa, #15929, filed July 5, 1979. Also see 
State v. Cooley, 575 P.2d 693. 
Further, since all of the offenses were committed 
simultaneously, in the presence of the arresting officer, 
were all known to the Court at the time of petitioner's 
original appearance, and since the prosecuting attorney 
is an officer of the Court, it would appear that the 
requirement that the offenses be known to the prosecuting 
attorney has been satisfied (T-6). Any other conclusion 
would result in a prosecuting attorney being able to 
thwart the legislative intent in the passage of a statute 
merely by shirking his duties and professing ignorance. 
At the very least, the prosecuting attorney in this matter 
should be presumed to know of the offenses, or in the 
alternative estopped to deny that which is common knowledge 
to the police and the Court, and which it is his duty to 
know. 
76-1-403 (1) (a) and (b) (ii) U.C.A., 1953, as amended, 
provide: 
76-1-403. Former prosecution barring subsequent 
prosecution for offense out of same episode.--
(!) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one 
or more offenses arising out of a single criminal 
episode, a subsequent prosecution for the same or 
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a different offense arising out of the same criminal 
episode is barred if: (Emphasis added.) 
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense 
that was or should have been tried under section 
76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution; and 
* * * (ii) Resulted in conviction .... (Emphasis added.) 
76-1-403(3) defines the term "conviction" as follows: 
7 
(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted 
in a judgment of guilt that has not been reversed, 
set aside, or vacated; a verdict of guilty that has 
not been reversed, set aside, or vacated; or a plea of 
guilty accepted by the court. (Emphasis added.) 
In this case the pleas of guilty were not only accepted by 
the court but the petitioner was sentenced on the charges. 
The District Court apparently based its denial of the 
Petition on the finding that the offenses with which 
petitioner was charged were all separate offenses, and 
therefore did not constitute a single criminal episode (R-15 
and T-8). This result appears to confuse the distinction 
between "double jeopardy," which precludes the subsequent 
trial of a defendant for the same offense if he has been 
previously tried therefor, with the statutory bar granted 
by the legislature in 76-1-401 (et seq.) U.C.A., 1953, as 
amended, which repeatedly refers to separate or multiple 
offenses. (See State v. Sosa, supra.) 
The purpose of the statute is separate and distinct 
from the protection afforded by the "double jeopardy" clause, 
in that it bars a multiplicity of trials where the various 
offenses could and should have been tried in a single trial 
in a single court, as is the case in this instance. 
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8 
While the offenses charged here are not included in 
the Utah Criminal Code, it is apparent that 76-1-103 U.C.A., 
1953, as amended, makes the provisions of the Utah Criminal 
Code govern prosecutions under any offenses outside the 
Criminal Code and would thus include the Title 41, u.c.A., 
1953, as amended, violations with which petitioner was 
charged. 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear in this case that all of the offenses 
involving the petitioner occurred simultaneously, and 
involved the same illegal and criminal act, to wit; the 
driving of a vehicle; which said illegal criminal driving of 
the vehicle is the sole criminal objective of all of the 
offenses, and thus constitutes a single criminal episode. 
Since all of the offenses were Class B misdemeanors, 
they are clearly within the trial jurisdiction of the 
Circuit Court, and could and should have been tried 
simultaneously. 
All of the offenses were indisputably known to the 
arresting officer, and the Court, at the time petitioner 
appeared and entered his pleas. The offhand claim of the 
prosecuting attorney of a lack of knowledge of the offense 
appears to be without substance, and is at best a futile 
attempt to thwart the operation of the statutory bar (T-6). 
The petitioner, having entered a plea of and having 
been found guilty and sentenced on three of the offenses, 
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is clearly entitled to the statutory bar contained in 
76-1-401 (et seq.) U.C.A., 1953, as amended. 
For these reasons, the petitioner respectfully requests 
the Court to grant his petition and issue its Order 
prohibiting the Circuit Court from proceeding further with 
the charge against him, and further ordering said Court 
to dismiss said charge. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this :J~ dayo~ 
1979. 
~~ 
Attorney for Petitioner-
Appellant 
516 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING~ ~ /) 
I certify that on the J6 day of~ 
1979, I deposited in the U.S. Mail, first class, postage 
prepaid, two true and accurate copies of the foregoing 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT, addressed to: Davis County Attorney, 
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